A global energy transition is underway. Limiting warming to 2°C (or less), as envisaged in the Paris Agreement, will require a major diversion of scheduled investments in the fossilfuel industry and other high-carbon capital infrastructure towards renewables, energy efficiency, and other low or negative carbon technologies. The article explores the scale of climate finance and investment needs embodied in the Paris Agreement. It reveals that there is little clarity in the numbers from the plethora of sources (official and otherwise) on climate finance and investment. The article compares the US$100 billion target in the Paris Agreement with a range of other financial metrics, such as investment, incremental investment, energy expenditure, energy subsidies, and welfare losses. While the relatively narrowly defined climate finance included in the US$100 billion figure is a fraction of the broader finance and investment needs of climate-change mitigation and adaptation, it is significant when compared to some estimates of the net incremental costs of decarbonization that take into account capital and operating cost savings. However, even if the annual US$100 billion materializes, achieving the much larger implied shifts in investment will require the enactment of long-term internationally coordinated policies, far more stringent than have yet been introduced.
Introduction
The Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015, known as COP21 (the 21st
Conference of the Parties under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC) arrived at an agreement (the Paris Agreement) to keep average global warming well below 2°C. A number of new studies were published in the run up to COP 21 that included headline figures relating to climate finance and investment needs. There is considerable and longstanding debate over the climate finance and investment needs that would be needed to achieve this aim. Indeed, studies of the optimal cost of climate stabilisation strategies offer a wide range of uncertainty reflecting differences in models, methods and economic assumptions. The decision adopting the Paris Agreement reconfirmed the existing commitment of the international community to mobilise $100 billion a year in assistance for developing countries, but this is only one estimate, and does not cover the full scope of climate finance, with that scope itself contested. Perhaps the only fact on which the literature is agreed, is that there exists a large climate finance "gap" -a gap between current climate-friendly financial flows, and those that would be needed to achieve long term climate stabilisation goals (Bowen, Campiglio, & Herreras Martinez, 2015; Fankhauser, Sahni, Savvas, & Ward, 2016; Haites, 2011; Olbrisch, Haites, Savage, Dadhich, & Shrivastava, 2011) . There are shorter-term 'specialized' climate-finance gaps (e.g. up to 2020; World Bank, 2015) as well as longer-term cumulative climate-related investment/incremental investment gaps (e.g. 2010 -2050 McCollum et al., 2013) .
Studies of the optimal cost of climate stabilization strategies offer a wide range of uncertainty reflecting differences in models, methods, and economic assumptions.
The US$100 billion target contained in the Paris Agreement is only one estimate of climatefinance requirements, but there are many others with which it may usefully be compared (Zadek, 2011) . In the run-up to and since COP 21, a number of new studies were published that included headline figures relating to climate finance and investment needs. This paper reviews the nature and scale of these new estimates as well as other existing literature, in order to explore the financial investment implications of achieving the 2°C target.
In this article, we triangulate some key numbers of climate finance and investment from different sources, as a reality check on the scale of the political and policy challenges ahead.
We provide some historical background to the meaning and scale of the term 'climate finance' and climate investment in the context of the UNFCCC, consider some recent shifts in perceptions about the prospects of this finance becoming available and explore the kinds of policy measures that will be required for this to be the case.
Climate-related finance and investment.
Financing climate action has always been a critical part of the politics of the climate negotiations since their inception. One of the earliest attempts in the climate negotiations to quantify the scale of public and private climate-related finance arose in the context of tracking Parties' commitments to the issue of development and transfer of technologies (UNFCCC, 2008) . Climate finance has grown in the years since then, most markedly since 2011. At the same time, the initial emphasis on finance for capacity building and mitigation projects has been re-balanced towards a more even balance on mitigation and adaptation policies, measures, and technologies.
Under the UNFCCC 'climate-finance' has evolved from an initial phase with an emphasis on short-term and relatively modest flows to a second phase with an emphasis on longer-term and more substantial flows. In phase 1 (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ) it referred to 'funding' (rather than finance) in relation to several agenda items regularly discussed under the Convention. These included: adaptation (initially very small amounts), transfer of technology, mitigation, national communications and capacity building. Article 11 of the UNFCCC established a 'Financial Mechanism' that is entrusted to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) along with other 'international entities'. Phase 2 (2009-the present) is characterized by an emphasis on 'long-term finance' involving specified financial targets and timetables (e.g. 2014-2020) The US$100 billion has since become a key policy reference point. It is the current scale at which, in terms of climate finance, the international climate negotiations function (e.g. (OECD, 2015) . These amounts include 'finance from a variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of financing, to support climate change adaptation and mitigation actions in developing countries'. The largest share, however, was public finance (Figure 1(a) ).
The US$100 billion (Figure 1(b) ) is also, according to the OECD, the same order of magnitude as the total public development assistance budget from all donors to all recipients for all causes in 2014 (around US$140 billion - Figure 1 (c) green and light blue bars). Total net financial flows (including market-driven private flows) are considerably greater bringing the overall total close to $US 600 billion in 2014 (Figure 1(c) ). Development assistance serves multiple policy objectives. Filtering financial flows to isolate 'climate-related' projects involves a high degree of methodological uncertainty. 'Climate' is a bundled, multifaceted label (from energy to human health, sanitation, and agriculture).
Labelling development assistance in this way is not a straightforward accounting practice and can be methodologically challenging as finance projects can have multiple objectives (e.g. Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011a) . It is possible that some of the 'growth' in climaterelated finance and investment could be a reallocation and/or relabelling of existing aid flows (e.g. Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011b) . Nevertheless, a proportion of this ODA is officially marked as 'climate-related' (despite methodological uncertainties). Total commitments on bilateral and multilateral climate-related development finance commitments (from OECD Development Assistance Committee members, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), and the GEF) in 2014 amounted to approximately US$39 billion (according to a recipient perspective), the majority of which was for mitigation projects (Figure 2(a) ).
Around two-thirds of this annual US$39 billion is for energy-, transport-and storage (logistics)-related projects (Figure 2(b) ). (Jachnik, Caruso, & Srivastava, 2015; UNFCCC, 2014 This estimate is highly uncertain)
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Other official flows ( (a) Table 2 ). The incremental low-carbon and climate-resilient components of GFCF are, by definition, a fraction of this overall figure. Estimates of future business-as-usual infrastructure investment requirements to realize GDP and population growth forecasts vary widely in the literature (Table 2) , as do the incremental climate change-related components. The various investment estimates are tabulated in Table   2 , and presented graphically in Figure 3 . Table 2 and Figure 3 with the US$100 billion negotiation number, expressing the difference as a multiple of the US$100 billion figure. climate finance (OECD, 2015) 0.6 Table 3 shows that, compared to the Paris US$100 billion climate-finance target:
 Global annual fixed capital formation is of the order of 270 times larger;
 Global investment needs to meet the SDGs is of the order of 50-70 times larger;
 Global investment in energy infrastructure is of the order of 27 times larger.
Some types of climate finance are capable of leveraging investment. However the difference in scales between near-term climate finance and future climate investment needs shown in Figure 3 suggests there remains a significant climate finance gap.
The green growth opportunity.
Next, we explore the overall economic and welfare impacts of these climate-related Academic interest in green growth strategies dates largely to the turn of the millennium (e.g. Ekins, 1999) . By 2012 the combination of high commodity prices, financial crisis and upgraded risk assessments associated with climate change caused the concept of green growth to be adopted as a full-blown political and economic strategy by the major multilateral development banks and the OECD (Jacobs, 2012) .
Thus, between Copenhagen (COP 15) and Paris (COP21) there was an important change in the mood with which the international climate-change negotiations were conducted. Instead of 'burden sharing' the language was now of 'low-carbon opportunity'. In part, this was because the baselines against which the costs of climatec hange mitigation are compared had changed. Many estimates of cost of mitigation are 'panglossian' in that they assume 3%
GDP growth into the future, even when there is no significant emissions reduction, and therefore substantial projected climate change. Such optimistic assessments of future GDP growth remain mainstream. The IEA, for example, continues to project global GDP to grow at an average annual rate of 3.5% in the period 2013-2040 across each of its WEO 2015 scenarios (IEA, 2015, Table 1 .2, p. 37). But such projections assume away one of the main causes of concern about climate change -that it will not have a significant negative impact on economic activity.
The more optimistic discourse about climate-change mitigation derives partly from the fact that the policy process is beginning to look critically at the implicit costs of baseline scenarios in terms of what happens if there is no substantial mitigation of climate change.
The attack on the 'baseline' is summarized by Stern (2016) :
So the business-as-usual baseline, against which costs of action are measured, conveys a profoundly misleading message to policymakers that there is an alternative option in which fossil fuels are consumed in ever greater quantities without any negative consequences to growth itself.
Partly, the present green growth policy discourse is presenting the prospect of four (win-winwin-win) outcomes: (1) lower energy costs, (2) higher economic growth and employment, (3) reduced impacts from climate change, and (4) co-benefits such as reduced air pollution.
Bottom-up analyses of the cost of financing the low carbon pathway have been estimated at about 2-4% of expected capital expenditure up to 2030, with the net increase in financing costs being perhaps 0.7-2.3% of total financing for global capital expenditures (Beinhocker & Oppenheim, 2016) . Such costs are still substantial, and it is possible to overdo the win-win rhetoric, but even the high end of this range is around half of the costs to GDP associated with high oil prices in the period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . In financial and economic terms, it is now clear that in many regions and applications, properly costed, climate-change mitigation technologies are becoming increasingly affordable.
The discourse around decarbonization is changing and this is sending a different message to markets from even a few years ago: fossil fuels are the energy source of the past; the future is low-carbon (actually needs to be zero and negative carbon if the 2°C target, let alone 1.5°C, is to be met).
Genuine 'Green Growth' (i.e. renewables and energy efficiency) is now the strategic decarbonization imperative. Developing countries will not deliver on their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (their emission reduction commitments in the Paris Agreement), let alone make them more stringent, if doing so is perceived to constrain those countries' economic development.
The falling cost of renewables
There has been a rapidly changing technological landscape around renewables.
Increased public funding for renewable energy R&D, diffusion, and deployment has led to a virtuous circle of cost reductions, further policy support, and technological innovation that has achieved a colossal reduction in the cost of renewable energy sources in the last decade or so (Trancik, 2014) . 
Incremental costs versus incremental investment
The present value of operating cost savings from reduced fossil-fuel consumption should be taken into account when evaluating investments in energy efficiency and renewables.
Climate-finance analyses can focus on either incremental investment or incremental costs (Haites, 2011) . Generally incremental investment analysis is much simpler than incremental cost analysis as data on lifetimes, future energy prices, operating costs, and discount rates are not required.
Renewables have far lower operating costs than fossil-fuel plants, and investments in energy efficiency will also reduce energy-related expenditures in the future (provided they are accompanied by policies to prevent the rebound effect). This is clearly relevant to the overall economic impact of any additional capital costs incurred by climate mitigation investments. Haites (2011, p. 965) points out that the 'estimated incremental cost is usually much lower than the corresponding incremental investment'.
This difference in operating costs between a low-carbon and fossil-fuel energy system means that the scale of annual expenditure on energy and fuel as a proportion of GDP should also be considered when the financial implications of these different systems are being compared.
There are currently no officially published data at a country by country level on energy expenditure as a percentage of GDP. As a share of overall global GDP, energy expenditures have been estimated at around 8-9% (IER, 2010) . In line with rates of energy consumption, the majority of this expenditure is currently on fossil fuels. Some ad hoc While net cost or incremental methods for assessing investment requirements are contentious (Olbrisch et al., 2011) , such remarkably small estimates indicate how perceptions about the costs and benefits of emissions reduction have begun to change in recent years.
Environmental fuel taxation
There are many unpriced externalities associated with fossil-fuel energy consumption.
Interest in environmental fuel taxation based on full cost accounting is rising. The international policy landscape is moving towards including in calculations of energy subsidies not just the pre-tax producer and consumer subsidies but estimates that take account of the full costs of fossil-fuel combustion to society, including their full life cycle environmental costs (IMF, 2015) .
In 2015 IEA estimated that the value of direct financial fossil-fuel subsidies worldwide was US$493 billion (IEA, 2015, p. 96) . In contrast, the IMF (2015) estimated total energy subsidies (i.e. including external environmental costs) to be US$4.9 trillion (6.5% of global GDP) in 2013, and projected them to reach US$5.3 trillion (6.5% of global GDP) in 2015.
This provides another reference point for the US$100 billion. Fossil-fuel energy subsidies (including external environmental costs) are in the order of 53 times larger than the US$100 billion climate finance number. 
Policy imperatives and approaches: using billions to unlock trillions
Strong, stable, and sustained public policy is required to achieve the deployment of lowcarbon energy sources at the required rate to stay within the global temperature limits set by the UNFCCC. Incremental investment requirements and policy ambition/effectiveness are interdependent. Investment needs assessments make assumptions about the baseline policy landscape. Policy makes assumptions about finance and investment needs, opportunities, and gaps. Low-cost incremental investment scenarios such as those by the NCE (2014 NCE ( , 2015 to meet climate goals require ambitious and effective climate policies.
They not only require the rapid wholesale transformation of (for example) the electricity system but also substantial system-level impacts as a result of billions of individual consumer, investor, company micro decisions favouring lower energy, higher renewable futures, higher climate-resilient futures. Climate policy and incremental investment is a chicken and egg problem (Schmidt-Traub, 2015) .
Climate change is just one part of a broader landscape of investment required to achieve sustainability goals. The OECD neatly summed up the overall policy challenge in achieving the SDGs as 'using billions to unlock trillions' (OECD, 2016c, p. 27 ).
Very similar typologies of options and policies appear time and again on how best to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Frequently, these policy typologies are threefold: carbon pricing;
the stimulation of innovation and low-carbon technological development and deployment;
and removing barriers to behavioural change (Grubb, Hourcade, & Neuhoff, 2014; Stern, 2007) .
The need for consistent policy
The first priority for low-carbon policy to attract large-scale investment is that it should be long term, consistent, predictable, and transparent. The importance of this is illustrated by the reduction in investment in renewables brought about by the sudden policy changes by the UK government following its election in May 2015. Within a year, the UK, which had routinely topped the annual league table compiled by Ernst & Young of countries attractive to renewable energy investments had slid to 13th place (Guardian, 2016) . Policy-driven transitions in energy systems are complex in situ experiments within path-dependent sociotechnical systems. The need for consistent and stable policy environment has been expressed in many countries and by stakeholders including investors, suppliers, business users, policy makers (e.g. CBI, 2016).
The importance of carbon and fossil fuel prices and subsidies
The second important policy priority is that the prices of different energy sources reflect their full costs, requiring subsidies for fossil fuels to be removed and their prices to reflect their full environmental costs.
It needs to be recognized that an important consequence of an effective Post-Paris international policy regime would be even lower coal, oil, and gas prices. There are significant amounts of economically recoverable hydrocarbons and if the demand becomes constrained by climate policy -the price is likely to fall.
Private investment is playing and will play a major role in investments in the energy system, so investments will need to make a risk-reflective normal rate of return. The recent collapse in fossil-fuel prices has been rapid and deep and is having profound and complex impacts on the investment landscape. Low oil and gas prices help choke off investment in new fossilfuel developments. However, low oil and gas prices, by making clean energy less competitive, can also deter or delay investment in clean energy that is intended to substitute for current fossil-fuel sources.
However, until consumers get used to low energy prices, there is a potential opportunity to introduce carbon pricing at a time when policy and political resistance to it may be lower. For example, a US$50 a tonne carbon tax introduced now, while significantly increasing the consumer price, would not raise fossil-fuel prices beyond the levels to which consumers were accustomed before 2014 -but this window of potential political feasibility of a carbon tax will fade with the memory of the high oil prices.
Given the underlying strength of demand for fossil fuels (oil and gas in particular) in all currently mainstream future energy projections, there will be at some stage a recovery in the oil price as supply tightens. In the absence of alternatives, higher fossil-fuel prices are necessary to balance anticipated supply with global demand. As the IEA (2015, pp. 48-49) puts it:
The relationship between the supply cost curves and oil prices is not straightforward, but the inference is that a price in the range of $80-120/barrel is likely to be required to enable supply to meet demand in the New Policies Scenario to 2040.
There is therefore much interest in 'oil price trajectories'. More important perhaps are 'carbon price trajectories' that policy should be attempting to manage. Indeed future patterns in the investment landscape are all about the collisions of at least three inter-related price trajectories: oil, carbon, and the levelized costs of renewable/ low-carbon energy.
Carbon pricing is accelerating. According to World Bank and Ecofys (2016) carbon pricing is being applied to around 13% of global emissions -a threefold increase over the last decade.
China's plans for a national emissions trading scheme commencing in 2017 will take this figure to 25%. 
The need for support for low-carbon technologies
In many ways it is remarkable that investment in renewable energy technologies has continued at high levels despite the collapse in fossil-fuel prices (BNEF, 2015) . However, in the presence of widespread subsidies for fossil fuels, and the absence of systematic attempts to internalize their external costs, low-carbon energy sources are likely to be more expensive than high-carbon energy sources for some time. Under these circumstances, credible policy to support the low-carbon energy policy is essential. As already noted, such policy support needs to be consistent, predictable, and transparent.
Such policy support needs to include large research and development (R&D) programmes as well as a range of policies (Feed-in-Tariffs, portfolio targets, grants) for massive low-carbon deployment, to include renewables, nuclear, and carbon capture and storage, depending on national priorities, with predictable degression to reflect technological change (Grubb et al., 2014) .
With all governments now committed to low-carbon technologies in principle, the economic prizes for successful commercialization of them are enormous. For example, solutions to the problems of electricity storage, revolutionizing the utility of intermittent renewables, and learning how best to combine energy system with information and communication technologies will create markets worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Similarly, with estimates that 60% of the urban infrastructure that will exist in 2050 still needs to be built (UNEP, 2013, p. 6), the economic opportunities for the pioneers of more sustainable urban forms are very great -but so are the potential carbon emissions if this urbanization proceeds along current trajectories.
The need for changes in behaviour
Finally, the low-carbon transition would be made much simpler if increased awareness about the threat of climate change, and the behaviours which contribute to it, led to more fundamental behavioural change. Two major relevant areas in this regard are the installation of energy efficiency measures in buildings, moves to reduce food waste and excessive meat consumption, and producer/consumer alliances to control deforestation and forest degradation.
The importance of the behavioural dimension is a reflection of the fact that climate-change mitigation is not only a function of policy. The energy transition is a complex multifaceted series of evolutions/adaptations (Armstrong et al., 2016) . Coherent policy investment scenarios that take into account behavioural as well as technological change are now emerging. One example is a study by The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate on an investment scenario, comprising a set of practical recommendations, to achieve most of the emission reductions necessary to remain on the pathway to limiting global warming to 2°C by 2030 (NCE, 2015) .
Conclusions
Currently there is no prospect of a direct global regulatory approach to limit fossil-fuel extraction and use. Therefore, to have a reasonable chance of fulfilling the goal of the Paris Agreement of limiting global temperature rise to less than 2°C, the global economy needs to rapidly develop non-carbon energy sources that are cheaper, cleaner (e.g. creating less air pollution), and more convenient than fossil fuels. This in turn requires an acceleration of public and private investment targeted at developing low-carbon energy technologies across the innovation curve. To address the wider goal of avoiding excessive damage from climate change to which the world is already committed, considerable investments in climate resilience are also required to achieve lower cost adaptation strategies.
The key message in this article is that current levels of climate finance are more than an order The Paris Agreement came about because there was increased realization of these benefits among policy makers. In some cases, the policies to realize current commitments are lacking.
Moreover, current commitments do not yet match the targets in the Paris Agreement.
The technology and finance levers to achieve the substantive outcomes desired by the Paris Agreement are available. Recognition that deploying them entails more benefits than costs is growing. What is now required is that policy makers have the courage to act on this recognition in the limited time that is left for the Paris targets to remain within reach.
